Challenges of American Relations toward the Balkans

CHALLENGES OF U.S. RELATIONS TOWARD THE BALKANS

Abstract

After the end of the Cold War, the United States decided to preserve NATO as a first-rate foreign-policy instrument for the realization of national interests in a changed global environment, whereby NATO’s “open door” policy served to “fill the security vacuum” in Europe created after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Precisely this was one of the reasons for the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, which escalated into Russia’s military intervention in February 2022. The United States sought, by providing assistance to Ukraine, to ensure a development of events similar to that in Croatia, assessing that President Putin would nevertheless not launch a military intervention. This event can be regarded as key for contemporary global security, and the outcome of this conflict will to a great extent determine the future distribution of global power. The consequences of the war in Ukraine are evident in the political, economic, and above all security context, with global and regional reach, of which for Serbia the most significant are repercussions on the European continent, especially in the area of Southeast and Central Europe. Through the process of NATO enlargement, the United States managed to secure dominance in the Balkans, whereby since the beginning of the war in Ukraine—especially with the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance—challenges related to Serbia’s military neutrality and the uncertain fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession have become актуелизовани, due to the opposition of the Republika Srpska to moving in that direction. In addition, a challenge is certainly the resolution of the status of KiM, which in the context of the war in Ukraine gains a new dimension. The United States strives to resolve these security challenges, in the background of the conflict in Ukraine, by diplomatic means, assigning the role of mediator to the European Union.

Keywords: U.S. strategic posture, redistribution of global power, the Ukrainian war, Middle Eastern war conflict, the security architecture of the Balkans.

Success is not final, failure is not fatal,
the courage to continue is what counts.
Winston Churchill

Introductory considerations

The United States is a key state of contemporary international relations, and there is no need to cite other reasons to justify the subject of this research. Although this is not new in international relations, since such a claim has been valid from the end of the Cold War to the present day, one may justifiably ask why the U.S. strategic posture toward the Balkans should be re-examined. The answer to this seemingly simple question requires a more thorough analysis of contemporary international relations, because the United States is the only power with global reach and, consequently, global interests characteristic of a hegemon without precedent in history. However, considering the geostrategic posture of the United States without taking into account the relative decline of its power, the domestic political situation in the state, its perception of potential threats to global hegemony, and the assessment of the intentions of global challengers cannot provide an objective starting basis for considering its posture toward the Balkans. Only after we take into account the stated premises can we competently consider the American posture toward what seems still to be the post-conflict region of the Balkans.

An attempt to generate the attitude toward the Balkans from the general, global posture of the United States, without understanding U.S.–European Union relations, the war conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the already mentioned American priorities in relations with China and Russia, will not provide us with relevant results. Furthermore, there are also regional actors, whose policies are evaluated through the prism of Washington’s strategic priorities, as well as their potential power to contribute to the realization of American goals at the regional and/or global level.

Since the United States is a power with enormous potential for alliances, which it has skillfully used in past decades, it is certain that this fact indicates complexity regarding its obligations around the world. This fact is so complex that it almost makes no sense to deal with it at the global level, but we will therefore necessarily have to consider the basic postulates of its strategic posture that represent a certain kind of traditional posture of this power. Furthermore, we will strive to identify some characteristic patterns of U.S. strategic behavior in potentially crisis situations, such as, quite certainly, the one that characterizes contemporary international relations. For such an intention, we will predominantly use the realist school, which essentially provides a better understanding of international relations in times of wars and the behavior of its actors in such situations. Nevertheless, the liberal tradition of American society will not be neglected to the extent that ensures an objective picture of their traditional values.

The intention is to examine the basic guidelines of the geostrategic posture of the United States toward the Balkans, which is determined by the contemporary global environment and by certain patterns of U.S. behavior in the international arena that have brought this nation to the position of global hegemon, as well as by specific regional circumstances in which the Serbian factor alone has opted for military neutrality. This is also the basic hypothesis of the paper. Although we are deeply aware that the Balkans has not been a priority for American strategists for decades, we believe that the current war conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have increased the geostrategic significance of the Balkans and that Washington is following regional developments with greater attention, especially the relations of the Serbian factor toward Russia and China, but also in relation to European integration processes. Thus, it can be concluded that the position of the Serbian factor is very complex and that it should be carefully considered how Washington sees us and how our foreign-policy posture is perceived in the American strategic community. To avoid any confusion, American strategists quite certainly do not deal with the Serbian factor as a priority, but with regional processes, as befits a global hegemon. That is the basic reason why the Balkans is mentioned in the title of this paper.

Key patterns of the strategic action of the United States

In the past, many actors on the international scene underestimated American power and the ability to respond in a timely and long-term manner to challenges posed by the circumstances of international politics. It seems that too often their idealistic and liberal narratives and ideas around the world were understood as a sign of weakness, unfamiliarity with regional problems, or disinterest in international affairs. Nevertheless, the indisputable fact that the United States emerged from the global conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies as the winner and became the global hegemon indicates that Washington generally assessed the strategic environment well, its own power, and rationally determined national goals, as well as the means and ways by which they would be realized. It is clear that the aforementioned misconceptions about the United States became obvious in the period of international relations labeled as the “unipolar era (moment),” Pax Americana, and the like. The key question is whether contemporary challengers of the global hegemon have objective and realistic assessments of American and their own power, but also of the determination and skill of strategists in Washington. Of course, time will answer this question, but we will point to challenges in international relations that the United States has successfully overcome and in what way. This will give us a certain pattern that can be a guide to its actions in the future.

At first glance, the basic patterns of the American strategic posture appear confusing and contradictory. They are often, seemingly, polarized, as can be seen from the following examples: geopolitical realism versus universal idealism, or isolationism versus internationalism, or unilateralism versus multilateralism, etc. Nevertheless, they represent only an expression of strategic decisions, which by their nature are conditioned by the circumstances of the strategic environment, one’s own power, and goals in specific historical circumstances. What follows is an attempt to understand them and to view them as a consequence of different patterns of normative self-interpretation. Furthermore, when considering the American pattern of behavior, one should always keep in mind the following facts: it is based on opportunities and challenges, foreign policy is linked to the selection of rational decisions, their geostrategic posture is strongly influenced by domestic politics (Kissinger 2001), as well as the fact that American foreign policy is influenced by the past and tradition (Wittkopf et al. 2008: 17–18).

The first pattern of U.S. behavior is linked to the gaining of independence and the first president George Washington, who traced the first pattern of its behavior—namely, isolationism. On September 19, 1796, he stated that “Europe has a set of primary interests which for us (the United States, auth. note) have no significance at all, or are very remote. … Hence it is not wise for us to entangle ourselves in the vicissitudes of her politics and of her friendships or enmities” (Wittkopf et al. 2008: 18–19). Here one can clearly observe all four basic principles of American strategic thinking and action, with the caveat that one should emphasize that its “protection” by vast oceans and the absence of threats from immediate neighbors largely determined such behavior. At the same time, the young American republic at that time did not have sufficient power, nor ambitions, to interfere in European colonial conflicts, and one should add that it itself had been a colony and did not approve of such policy.

The United States has always worked to justify its foreign policy and present itself as the “good guy” in a righteous struggle between good and evil. American expansion to the West and the displacement of indigenous peoples was precisely justified by this narrative, later called “manifest destiny” (Gerhard, 2010: 204–205). To many American rivals in the world this narrative was incomprehensible and they often underestimated it, but it produced results both externally and internally. Simply put, manifest destiny often ensured national support for foreign policy and enabled U.S. interventionism, while also ensuring the reliability of its alliances in combination with the potential of American power. The Founding Fathers of the United States stated in the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal and have inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In largely feudal Europe, these guarantees were understood as highly significant, and thus the United States became the “land of opportunity for all.” From manifest destiny another peculiarity of the American pattern of behavior naturally derives—namely, exceptionalism. The United States has been a leader in international politics since the beginning of the 20th century due to its enormous resources and wealth, as well as its social values. The American interest in preserving the democratic and free world has its foundation in the beliefs and values it advocates (Pirnuta 2014: 121–128). When you consider the alternatives, this is indeed true, because the rivals of American democracy were totalitarian regimes, such as: militant and Nazi Germany in the two world wars, Fascist Italy and militant Japan in the Second World War, or the communist camp led by the USSR during the Cold War. In addition, American exceptionalism, with the strengthening of its power and position in the international order, proved to be a useful instrument for interventionism, as well as for long-term confrontation with great powers that followed later.

The continuity of the isolationist strategic posture of the United States can be traced throughout the entire 19th century, which was in a certain way also formulated in the Monroe Doctrine (1823), which “rebelled” against European interventionism on the American continent, but also further distanced itself from European “power games” and alliances of the great monarchies embodied in the Holy Alliance (Blagojević 2022: 150–151; Blagojević 2019a: 1144–1145). In the case of the Monroe Doctrine, too, the foundations of American exceptionalism can be seen, because in the era of Eurocentric international relations a non-European power emerges that formally opposes colonial interventions by European metropoles in their own backyard (Latin and Central America).

Idealism of one of the most important U.S. presidents, Woodrow Wilson, also relies on manifest destiny and exceptionalism and represents its natural continuation. He emphasized that “America’s obvious destiny is not to rule the world by physical force. . . . The destiny of America and the leadership of America is that she thinks about the world” (Mearsheimer 2018: 90). His famous “14 Points” represent a certain foundation of modern collective security and the foundation of the American multilateral posture. The заслуге of President Wilson for creating the League of Nations, the predecessor of the modern United Nations, cannot be disputed. The game of destiny, but also the tradition of isolationism, prevented the United States from joining the work of the League of Nations, which only confirms the great traditionalism of American society and its strategic posture in the world. Although during the Great War it entered the ranks of great powers, the interwar period the United States spent in a kind of “splendid isolation,” following the example of Great Britain from the previous era of international relations. However, isolationism relates to European politics, and not to processes in Central and South America, which the United States considers its zone of interest, following the logic of behavior of great powers.

The emergence of two totalitarian orders in Europe, in states that were great continental powers—Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union—was not sufficient reason for the United States to engage more in European affairs. America concluded economic arrangements with most European states and monitored events related to the expansion of militant Japan in the Pacific region. It was precisely the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that, in a certain way, forced the United States to “wake up” from isolationism, primarily on the Pacific theater, but also in relation to traditional allies in Europe. America, guided by a certain war logic, continuously helped even the communist Soviet Union.

Although the alliance of the United States and the USSR was reliable until the very end of the war, the United States primarily directed its strategic posture toward control of the Pacific and the Mediterranean, in line with the continuity of the interests of a thalassocratic power. Although Moscow requested the opening of the Western Front in Europe as early as 1942, the Allies did not do so even after victory in Africa, but focused on controlling the Mediterranean and forcing Italy out of the war. London proposed that the European mainland be attacked via Italy and the Balkans and that through the “soft underbelly” of Europe one could more easily penetrate into Central Europe, while the United States proposed a plan of attack across the English Channel, against France. The reason for this is the fact that it suited the West for the two totalitarian regimes to exhaust each other in a continental conflict in which the Soviets in 1943 had greater chances for victory. Unlike the totalitarian leaders Hitler and Stalin, who fought a life-and-death struggle, they had the possibility of choice (Blagojević 2022: 197).

In this example, one can strongly observe another pattern of the American strategic posture and the narrative that accompanies it—namely, the struggle of good and evil, that is, democracy against autocracy and totalitarianism. This strategic posture prevailed in the U.S. strategic posture throughout the entire Cold War period. Truth be told, it is clear that such a posture also had strong justification in reality, because the United States had as an adversary a totalitarian communist regime and its allies, who were additionally devastated by a catastrophic war conflict. For that reason, the narrative of the United States as the leader of the free world was justified by the real state of affairs, and in the end it emerged from that global conflict as the undisputed winner. Here it should be noted that, besides the stated basic principles of posture in the domain of strategic communications, it should be emphasized that during the Cold War the United States constantly aligned its posture toward the communist bloc with real geopolitical interests (Gadis 2003: 242–244), about which Nebojša Vuković writes very argumentatively (see Vuković 2007). Such a posture maintained continuity in the post–Cold War period as well, especially in posture toward the Russian Federation and China (Coker 2016: 89.140).

The beginning of the Cold War, among other things, represents a turning point from the long period of traditional American “flirtation” with isolationism, which followed as a consequence of accepting the ideas of George Kennan изложених in the famous Long Telegram (Kennan 1946). The American strategy of containing the Soviet Union подразумевала maintaining a robust military presence in Europe, but also in the Indo-Pacific and other regions where there was a danger of the spread of communism. For that it was necessary to use dominance in the navy to control the world’s oceans (Kaplan 2012: 68), nuclear armament, but also a system of alliances. Furthermore, Kennan emphasized that military power by itself might not prove sufficient, although it is of crucial importance for suppressing the Soviet threat. Although the Soviet leadership was disinclined to rational decision-making, but very sensitive to the “logic of force,” Kennan states that in the long term it is necessary to use economic, political, cultural, and diplomatic means as well (Blagojević 2016: 476).

The collapse of the communist camp brought the United States into a unique position of hegemon in world politics. In such a strategic environment, the United States behaves in accordance with the adopted pattern of strategic action and it seems it did not resist the temptation to try to impose its values and system of governance on the world, relying on exceptionalism, manifest destiny, democratic values as much as on the economic and military power that is without precedent (which in almost all U.S. strategies must necessarily be globally dominant and without any doubt in their sufficiency). In security terms, the process of NATO enlargement stands out in particular, which was in an identity crisis after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the collapse of the USSR. Namely, it is difficult even to imagine a great power voluntarily renouncing a first-rate foreign-policy instrument, so it could not be expected of the United States either, especially at a time when it was necessary to fill the “security vacuum” in Europe created by the collapse of the Soviet bloc. In several waves, states of Central and Southeast Europe were admitted into NATO membership, despite Russia’s warnings that such a process is considered directed against its security, especially with regard to Ukraine. Russia first, with a military intervention in Georgia in 2007, and then in Syria, demonstrated determination to intervene again outside its national territory in order to protect its interests, but this did not affect American plans and the posture toward Moscow. Thus, NATO’s open door policy, which did not take into account Russian security interests and determination to intervene outside national territory, led to a large-scale war conflict in Europe after the Second World War. The United States and its European allies reacted in a unified manner to the emergence of the crisis by providing political, economic, and military assistance to Ukraine and by imposing a large number of sanctions on Russia and Belarus. On the other hand, Russia secured reliable alliances primarily with China, Belarus, Iran, and (mostly tacit) support of many developing states on all continents.

The terrorist attacks on U.S. soil of September 11, 2001 only confirmed and strengthened the basic patterns of U.S. strategic action. Washington’s reaction was the adoption of a new strategic-doctrinal framework for fighting transnational Islamist terrorism, in which military power was predominantly used, through the concept of preemptive strikes. Military interventions followed in Afghanistan, and somewhat later in Iraq, with a questionable outcome for U.S. national interests. It seems that the aspect of the “battle for hearts and minds” of the Islamic world was neglected, which further led to the antagonism of part of the Islamic world toward the United States, and one could say the global South as well. This resulted in increasing resistance to proclaimed American values, which was strengthened by Washington’s ever-stronger reliance on elements of hard power, primarily through the use of coercive diplomacy and military power. During all that time, China was strengthening economically, but when it launched a significant reform and modernization of the armed forces, especially the navy, the United States followed the course of events, especially the creation of an alliance with Russia and the transfer of armaments and technology in the field of defense. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, as well as the crisis caused by the visit of the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, led to the tightening of relations between the United States and allies on the one hand and Russia and China on the other. China began massive military exercises around Taiwan, indicating Beijing’s readiness to defend territorial integrity by force of arms. The American response to contemporary challenges at the strategic level is to contain Russia and outcompete China. Thus, Washington realized that global challengers are serious competitors for global hegemony and that their ambitions are aligned with their power potential. In that sense, alliances and partnerships in Europe and the Indo-Pacific were strengthened with proven and reliable regional “players,” except Turkey, which shows ambitions for autonomy and unilateral action. Washington provides reliable security guarantees and skillfully uses strategic communication toward challengers, but also toward allies. For this claim, the fact that in a time of crisis NATO admitted geopolitically important states Sweden and Finland as full members, which had long been neutral, is more than sufficient, whereby the Alliance confirmed vitality and credibility. For the United States, a major challenge is how to position itself toward the war in Israel, which tests its credibility as a guarantor of security to a traditional ally in the Middle East, while on the other hand it must not undermine relations with the Islamic (Arab) world and must not call into question its global dominance in the longer run.

The current U.S. posture in the Balkans: the most important side issue in Europe

The geopolitical significance of Yugoslavia during the Cold War was largely conditioned by significant differences between Yugoslav communists and the Soviet Union, the progressive introduction of the model of self-management socialism, which could represent an alternative for other communist countries, as well as its strategic location given by proximity to member states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty (Vomlela 2016: 65–66). Warren Zimmermann was appointed U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1989 and stated that his work was largely determined by the new U.S. relationship toward the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were in the process of democratization, and he showed Yugoslav political elites that Yugoslavia no longer had the geopolitical significance that the United States had given it during the Cold War.” (Zimmermann 1995: 2) At that time, the key issues for the United States were human rights, civil liberties, and democratization, which determined the American stance toward certain states in the region. In this context, Zimmermann admitted that “Yugoslavia in that regard was not good, especially in the province of Kosovo.” (Zimmermann 1995: 2).

On the eve of the breakup of the SFRY, the United States primarily focused on supporting Ante Marković, the reform-oriented federal prime minister, who was an alternative to republican leaders. American diplomacy tried to secure support for him in Western Europe. A few days before the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Belgrade. However, his mission lacked a concrete vision and was based on the stance that the United States wanted a united and democratic Yugoslavia. His effort was directed toward the position that the international community would tolerate neither unilateral declarations instead of dialogue, nor the use of force. Baker did not succeed in calming passions in Yugoslavia, and during talks with various republican actors in the crisis he realized that the political situation would move in the direction of rising tensions, which gradually led the American administration to a decision to leave the initiative to the then European Community. According to Živorad Kovačević, the last Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, this decision had serious consequences stemming from the fact that the European Community was not sufficiently integrated and ready to manage the Yugoslav crisis (Kovačević 2007: 79). On the other hand, it created space for Germany to demonstrate dominance in Europe, which managed to convince the French and the British to recognize Croatia’s independence and to lobby other European metropoles to do so.

The escalation of the conflict forced American diplomacy to change its attitude toward certain Yugoslav republics in accordance with the strategy of low-intensity conflict, which the Reagan administration adopted. The united stance of the Slovenian and Croatian separatist political elites toward centers of power in the West presented the authorities in Belgrade as pro-communist and reminded them of the old mantra about Serbs as “little Russians” in the Balkans (Blagojevic 2019b: 370–376). American diplomatic, propaganda, intelligence, and in a later phase military effectiveness was engaged against Serbian interests. For the first time, NATO militarily intervened outside the territory of its member states against the Army of Republika Srpska in BiH in 1995, and the great “crescendo” of the struggle for the Yugoslav наследство followed in 1999 with NATO’s intervention against the FRY, which, paradoxically, was launched in support of the armed uprising of Albanians from KiM (Blagojević 2022: 343–360). From a contemporary standpoint, one can consider the consequences for Serbian national interests, which are the result of the wrong assessment of the global and regional strategic environment by the Serbian political elite of that time. In the West, an image of Serbs as aggressors against the peoples with whom they lived in the former state was formed, and they almost copied their foreign-policy posture toward them from the Slovenian and Croatian narrative—both Sarajevo and later the local authorities in Priština. Podgorica joined them as well, which through this narrative gained domestic and foreign-policy support for separation from the common state with Serbia in 2006. This narrative, in this or that form, is still present today to a greater or lesser extent, which depends on the needs of political elites in the former republics of the SFRY, and it only grew and took on heavier forms and potential with the beginning of the military intervention of the Russian Federation in Ukraine.

Priština unilaterally declared independence in 2008, with the support of the United States and its allies and partners, after unsuccessful negotiations organized by the United Nations. From 2011, the United States left the European Union the mediating position in negotiations between Belgrade and Priština and thereby, it seems, made the same mistake as at the beginning of the break-up/disintegration of the former SFRY[1]. However, this time Washington’s representatives closely followed developments and intervened when necessary, sometimes discreetly and sometimes publicly and directly[2]. The reasons for such a posture of the United States should be sought in the fact that Russia and China, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, sided with Serbia in preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this way, these two powers, strategically speaking, “cheaply” demonstrate power in the Balkans and show that the West has not placed this region under effective control. Furthermore, the Russian political elite, by periodically pointing to the unlawful effort of the United States/West to legalize the secession of the territory of the southern Serbian province and the position of Serbs in Kosmet, highlights this as its own justification for undertaking political and military measures outside its own national territory. In doing so, they often use the comparison of NATO’s military intervention in the FRY, of which as particularly significant they present that precedent of violating the provisions of international law as a sufficient reason for their military engagement in Ukraine.

Similarly, the United States positions itself in its strategic posture toward BiH, whereby it left the function of High Representative to European officials, while its representatives become involved only when crisis situations are hinted at, when it is necessary to highlight support for stability and/or the preservation of the integrity of BiH. The introduction of personal sanctions against the President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik is justified precisely by the stated reasons.

Here another U.S. interest for supporting the Federation of BiH, as well as the temporary authorities in Priština, is clearly highlighted. It is the fact that both political establishments clearly demonstrated the desire to join NATO, which is undoubtedly a desirable political position for Washington. In the case of BiH, this cannot be realized without the consent of Republika Srpska, which follows Serbia’s policy of military neutrality. For the so-called Kosovo, the biggest obstacle is the fact that it does not have a “seat in the United Nations,” so this fact is just one more reason for American support for the independence of Kosmet.

Unlike the reliance on the European Union with regard to the realization of diplomatic posture, on the security and military plane the United States primarily relies on NATO. In doing so, it assigned the role of balancer of Serbia’s military power to Croatia (Vukadinović 1996: 148–165), which logically also has political “competences” in regional opposition to Serbia with its, not accidentally built, informal alliances with the capitals of former republics of the SFRY on the bases of “containing Serbian regional hegemony and revisionism.” As proof of the stated claims, one can consider Croatia’s strategic response, as well as that of the United States, to the modernization and equipping with modern means of the Serbian Armed Forces, which was initially accompanied by the narrative of Prime Minister Plenković that “Vučić is threatening with an empty rifle,” to demands that the arming of Croatia be helped so that it could match Serbia. Furthermore, in the case of Ukraine, Croatia also appears as a kind of example of how Ukraine should solve the problem of the rebellious provinces in Donbas. This strategic idea turned into the nightmare of the Ukrainian war we are witnessing, in which the United States/NATO participates with similar means as in the wars for the Yugoslav legacy (Kostić Šulejić, Blagojević 2024: 456–479).

Concluding considerations

The priority engagement of the world hegemon in a relatively small and poor region such as the Balkans during the 1990s could rather be called an exception than systematic engagement, but when this region is concerned this is not the case. Namely, with the change of власти in Belgrade in 2000, priority engagement of the United States ends, and in 2001 terrorist attacks occur on its national territory and priorities shift to the global fight against terrorism. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the reduction of presence in Iraq, attention is directed to the South China Sea and the Ukrainian crisis, where the United States engages in strengthening alliances and providing security guarantees up to strengthening military presence in crisis regions by its own forces and NATO. Since Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in 2022, priorities have been directed to this conflict, and the later conflict in Israel has caused American engagement to take place simultaneously in both crisis regions. Perhaps U.S. engagement toward Ukraine is most effectively described by Vladimir Trapara, who succinctly described it as action between geopolitics and ideology, alluding to the basic vertical and value paradigm of American foreign-policy engagement (Trapara 2023: 53–67). Similar is the case with its engagement toward the war in the Middle East, which from Washington is viewed as a war between democracy and Palestinian terrorist organizations Fatah and Hezbollah.

Although the Balkan question has been far from primary U.S. interests for several decades, Washington has never lost interest in monitoring and crucially directing processes in this region, and has engaged the European Union as the “contractor.” Hence the subtitle the most important side issue in Europe, referring to the Balkans, which at the beginning of the war in Ukraine found itself in closer proximity to a large-scale war conflict, where Serbia and BiH are the only states that are not in NATO. This fact indeed complicates the Serbian position, as does the fact that Serbia and Turkey are the only states in Europe that have not imposed sanctions on Russia. Because of Kosmet and the uncomfortable rhetoric of the Kremlin aimed at equating U.S./NATO engagement in 1999 and their engagement in the case of Ukraine, Washington opted to continue supporting the independence of the so-called Kosovo, but also to respect Serbia’s policy of military neutrality, among other things due to fear that with its admission to the Alliance a “Russian Trojan horse” would appear in NATO, as well as due to an objective assessment of public opinion in Serbia and sentiment toward Kosmet. The appointment of the experienced diplomat Christopher Hill as ambassador to Serbia, with a history of engagement in this area during the 1990s, in contrast to his actions today, illustrates constants and differences in American policy toward the region, especially in relation to the Serbian factor. At the same time, one should keep in mind the fact that Serbia has learned some strategic lessons and that it strives to realize its national interests primarily by political and economic means, but also to preserve basic capacities of foreign-policy autonomy. It seems that the concept of military neutrality is the “right measure of things” that creates optimal conditions for such a strategic commitment of Serbia in the uncertain future of world politics. How sufficient it is, as always, time will show, and it is up to us to use that time in the right way so that we are ready to use the opportunities that arise and minimize risks through timely action.

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