SUDAN – FROM MILITARY COUP TO GEOPOLITICAL CRISIS

 

 SUDAN – FROM MILITARY COUP TO GEOPOLITICAL CRISIS

The geopolitical relevance of Sudan stems from its position at the crossroads of Northeast Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, but above all from the fact that Sudan is one of the few large states in the interior of the continent that simultaneously has access to the Red Sea, that is, to a maritime corridor which, via the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, directly connects to the main flows of global trade. Accordingly, any prolonged destabilization of the western coast of the Red Sea, or even the mere rerouting of ships and decline in traffic, immediately affects transportation costs and, consequently, the global economy. With this in mind, it is no coincidence that the conflict in Sudan, in addition to the struggle for political legitimacy and resources, has also become a struggle for control over the “arteries” of international logistical hubs. In addition to the trade-transport dimension, Sudan is also an infrastructural node for the energy security of its neighbors: the oil pipeline system through which South Sudan exports oil to the Red Sea passes through Sudanese territory, and as we will see later in the text, Sudan has become a neuralgic point where the rivalries of Middle Eastern countries manifest.

The overthrow of Omar al-Bashir and its epilogue

The formal beginning of the Sudanese crisis and revolution can be dated to December 19, 2018. The reason for the protests was a sudden increase in the prices of basic commodities. Soon, the protests turned entirely against then-president Omar al-Bashir, who had until then ruled the country with authority ever since the military coup of 1989 through which he came to power. Although the protests were predominantly peaceful, al-Bashir responded by declaring a state of emergency on February 22, 2019, and carrying out mass arrests. However, the previously successful methods of intimidation did not bear fruit this time. New demonstrations erupted in early April, and the army, which had supported al-Bashir for decades, sided with the protesters and protected the people from the police and various paramilitary formations. Omar al-Bashir was removed from power in a military coup on April 11, 2019. The formal executor of the coup was al-Bashir’s long-time associate, Minister of Defense and Lieutenant General Ahmed ibn Auf. However, the protesters were not satisfied with this choice, considering ibn Auf too close to al-Bashir. Their support went to the man who first extended a hand to them during the tense protests, the central figure of the Sudanese revolution – General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Power was assumed by the Transitional Military Council (TMC), headed by al-Burhan. The TMC decided to completely ignore the will of the people, who in fact wanted to reduce the role of the military in the state. The demonstrators refused to disperse and formed a broad popular coalition – the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), composed, among others, of professional associations of Sudanese workers and trade unions, various movements for greater women’s rights in society, etc. Tense negotiations on the country’s future between the military (TMC) and civil society (FFC) took place throughout April and May 2019, alongside ongoing protests. This time, the people did not accept the army’s rosy promises of a better future, which the military has routinely resorted to during any social unrest, practically since the creation of Sudan as an independent state, and continuously since 1989.

The transitional period and the 2021 coup

The next catalyst of the Sudanese revolution was the event of June 3, 2019, known as the Khartoum massacre. A radical faction within the TMC – the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – decided to end the protests through the heavy use of force. Live ammunition, large quantities of tear gas, and armored vehicles were used. The outcome was 100 dead and around 300 injured civilians, along with mass arrests. The RSF originates from the paramilitary formation known as the Janjaweed (“devils on horseback”) militia. It is a tribal-based formation present in Sudan, Chad, parts of Libya, and Yemen. Members of this militia committed numerous war crimes during the Sudanese civil war in the Darfur province in 2004. A certain number of Janjaweed commanders joined the RSF and secured positions within the TMC. Despite the force used against them, the demonstrators refused to yield. A general strike was organized, paralyzing the country. After the strike, renewed negotiations, and several smaller clashes with the RSF, the protesters achieved a partial victory: on August 20–21, 2019, a new governing body was formed – the Sovereign Council of Sudan, representing a joint civilian-military administration. From the civilian side, Abdalla Hamdok was appointed Prime Minister of Sudan, while General al-Burhan served as Chairman of the Sovereign Council on behalf of the military. According to the agreement, the Council was to function during a transitional period of 39 months, after which general and free elections would be held. During this period, military and civilian authorities were to alternate in chairing the Sovereign Council.

Initially, it seemed that the agreement was working: the situation stabilized, and efforts were made toward agreements and reforms in the field of the judiciary. However, the economy remained in a difficult state, with inflation being the biggest problem. Sporadic protests continued, as civilian representatives were dissatisfied with the fact that the military had been allowed to control and exploit gold mines in the north of the country—specifically the RSF formation that had clashed with protesters. On October 25, 2021, al-Burhan dissolved the Sovereign Council and carried out a military coup, while the civilian representative, Prime Minister Hamdok, was placed under house arrest. Al-Burhan became the undisputed leader of Sudan.

The reasons why the Sudanese army decided on the 2021 coup lie in its unwillingness to share power with civilians. The coup was carried out exactly four weeks before the deadline for the rotation of the chairmanship of the Sovereign Council. The military and al-Burhan did not want to hand over power to civilians and Hamdok, because the chair holds predominant influence within the Council and dictates its work. Al-Burhan claimed that he had taken power in order to “correct the course of the revolution,” but in reality, he could not allow civilians to take full control, as that would likely have led to the extradition of former President Omar al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court and a more serious investigation into the Khartoum massacre. This would have significantly damaged the reputation of the army, which brings us to the essence of the matter: the “master” of Sudan is not al-Burhan, just as before him it was not even al-Bashir. The main authority in Sudan lies, and has always lain, with the army as a collective. Throughout the entire history of Sudan as an independent state, very few important political figures have been independent of the military, and the army has maintained uninterrupted continuity of power since 1989. When the army assessed that al-Bashir no longer had credibility, it discarded him and installed al-Burhan as a new exponent. The Sudanese army does not favor radical Islamic movements, but it favors liberal democracy even less and acts as a “braking force” for the development of both tendencies in Sudanese society. Seeking a model in the army of neighboring Egypt, the Sudanese military strives to maintain its influence in society while proclaiming a vision of a stable Sudan.

The character and course of the conflict

On the night between April 14 and 15, 2023, armed clashes began in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan – the de facto president of Sudan – and the RSF, commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as General Hemeti. The RSF originates from the aforementioned Janjaweed militia. Instead of being disbanded after crimes of a genocidal nature in Darfur in the period 2003–2005, the Janjaweed, i.e., RSF, was “rebranded” in 2013. Since then, it has borne its current name and is nominally part of the Sudanese army, although it has a completely independent chain of command and military logistics. Immediately before the outbreak of the conflict, the RSF was estimated to number between 75,000 and 100,000 personnel, making it likely the largest paramilitary force in recent world history. During the conflict, the number of RSF fighters is around 100,000. The trigger for the outbreak of war was a failed plan to integrate the RSF into the regular Sudanese army, which was supposed to be the first step toward a transition to civilian rule. The real causes of the conflict are: (1) a military junta can have only one commander-in-chief; (2) no state can have two armies – the monopoly on the use of force is by definition indivisible; (3) control over channels for gold smuggling.

Hemeti (RSF) – left; Al-Burhan (SAF) – right
Source: BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65297714

In practice, during military coups, fighting is predominantly conducted in the capital, as key state institutions are located there. Somewhat surprisingly, from the very beginning, intense fighting also took place in the south of the country, as well as in the city of Meroe, about 300 km north of Khartoum. Soon, the conflict spread across the country, indicating that this is not an ordinary military coup. Nor is it a classic civil war motivated by ethno-religious differences, as there is no specific ethnic group represented by the RSF, and all participants are Muslim. It is a conflict between two armed factions fighting for control over resources and the state, as well as for international legitimacy.

Since the outbreak of the conflict on April 15, 2023, the dynamics of the war in Sudan have developed in waves, with the initial momentum being primarily fragmented and locally determined by the logic of urban warfare in Khartoum. The RSF relatively quickly managed to entrench itself in significant parts of the city and impose the tempo through the mobility of its units, while the SAF retained key state institutions and military infrastructure in the city, with an advantage in armored and air components on the battlefield. However, already during the autumn of 2023, the front expanded from the capital into the interior, and the entry of the RSF into Wad Madani represented a strong symbolic and logistical blow to the SAF, as it indicated the RSF’s ability to threaten communications and humanitarian corridors in the central and eastern parts of the country. The seriousness, or rather unpredictability, of the situation is also reflected in the fact that the SAF relocated its main headquarters and de facto capital to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. In the first half of 2024, the RSF reached the peak of its territorial expansion and operational initiative, including pressure toward the central regions of the country.

A turning point came in September–October 2024, when the SAF launched an organized counteroffensive, particularly in the capital, marking the first time after a long period that the actor dictating the tempo and possessing operational initiative changed. The SAF capitalized on this shift in the period January–May 2025 through the recapture of Wad Madani and major symbolic-operational gains in Khartoum (including regaining control over the presidential palace), along with the gradual consolidation of control over the wider capital zone. However, the western part of the country and the Darfur region remain firmly under RSF control, enabling them to initiate a political push for the recognition of parallel governments and even the division of the country. All of this took place in relative media silence. The event that brought global attention to the conflict in Sudan was the capture of the city of El Fasher by the RSF in October 2025, accompanied by severe atrocities. The siege lasted more than 550 days. When the RSF finally broke through the defensive lines, they executed around 60,000 people within a week, with higher estimates reaching up to 100,000 victims—more than the number of those killed in Gaza in the latest war.

There was concern that the RSF might do something similar in the province of Kordofan. This prompted the SAF to launch an offensive and break the blockade of the cities of Dilling and El Obeid.

Source: World Atlas: https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/sudan

At the beginning of February, effective control is shown on the following map:

Source: Warfronts: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC9h8BDcXwkhZtnqoQJ7PggA

One of the reasons why this conflict cannot be resolved is the excessive enthusiasm of both sides after each somewhat significant victory. Neither side has a serious intention to negotiate, while in reality neither has the strength to achieve a decisive victory. However, a logical question arises: why is the SAF suddenly gaining momentum? It is more likely a matter of geopolitical maneuvering than the military genius of its commanders.

The geopolitical game

Developments surrounding the Sudanese battlefield increasingly suggest realignments that could reshape a significant portion of the security architecture of the Red Sea, from Sudan to the Middle East. At the center of this process lies the growing rivalry between two key U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose opposing visions of who should emerge as the victor in Sudan are gradually translating into concrete actions on the ground. This became evident after the fall of El Fasher last October. The mass killings that followed the RSF’s victory triggered political shock, especially among Sudan’s neighbors: in Cairo, according to The New York Times, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi appeared visibly disturbed and warned that a red line had been crossed, while in Riyadh the reaction was even sharper. Within a few weeks, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman traveled to Washington and asked President Trump to help stop the war. This diplomatic initiative did not remain merely symbolic. Almost immediately after the meeting in Washington, Saudi Arabia began increasing material support to the SAF.

This was, by all accounts, a signal for the involvement of other actors. In recent weeks, advanced Turkish “Akinci” drones (an advanced version of the Bayraktar TB2) have appeared in the air force of the SAF, reportedly operating from Egypt. Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara did not suddenly decide to “go all in” in support of the SAF solely in reaction to El Fasher, but because they assessed that the support of the United Arab Emirates for the RSF had gone too far. Although they deny it, the UAE are deeply involved in the Sudanese conflict: money and weapons for the RSF are reportedly delivered via air bases in Chad (the city of Amdjarass in the east of the country) and Libya (Al Kufra airport), while the wounded are treated in Emirati hospitals. Abu Dhabi’s motives are multi-layered: from access to lucrative Sudanese gold deposits, through a sense of “political debt” due to the RSF’s role in the joint Saudi-Emirati intervention in Yemen, to the assessment that the SAF is too close to Sudanese Islamist elements. The validity of this claim can be debated, but it appears to be the stance of the UAE. As one of the UAE’s foreign policy priorities is the containment of “political Islam,” the RSF, which presents itself as a secular force, appears to Abu Dhabi as a more suitable option.

In contrast, the Saudi perspective is almost inverse: Saudi officials consider the SAF far more desirable than a militia such as the RSF, which they see as unpredictable, institutionally weak, and lacking legitimacy. A Sudan led by the RSF could spread instability along the Red Sea, which forms the western border of the kingdom. Saudi unease is further fueled by a broader pattern of Emirati “activism”: support for armed factions in Sudan and Yemen, support for General Haftar in Libya, and for Somaliland in Somalia. Saudi frustration with the UAE’s assertive policy is growing and is increasingly perceived as a source of instability. This is compounded by the deepening UAE–Israel partnership, which, in the atmosphere of post-conflict realignment following wars with Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran, Riyadh interprets as a potential signal of strategic encirclement in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Although they are nominally on the same side in Yemen in the fight against the Houthis, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have a specific rivalry for influence in southern Yemen.

Egypt, on the other hand, has existential reasons for its interest in the Sudanese conflict: as a state directly bordering Sudan, Cairo fears a scenario in which a militia accused of mass atrocities, even genocide, consolidates power and triggers a new wave of refugees toward Egypt. At the same time, Egypt is “sensitive” to the rapprochement between the UAE and Ethiopia, which it perceives as a threat due to the rhetoric of the Ethiopian prime minister and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project, which Cairo believes could jeopardize Egypt’s water security.

The massacre in El Fasher led Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara to abandon passivity and opt for more open and stronger support for the SAF, which in turn stimulated a series of recent successes on the battlefield. The goal is to cut off the logistics through which the UAE support the RSF. This includes closing Saudi and Egyptian airspace to Emirati cargo flights suspected of carrying weapons, as well as closing Somali ports to ships transporting military materiel. The campaign has, as reported, also included pressure on another long-standing patron of the RSF: General Haftar in Libya, who has played an important role in sustaining the RSF through fuel supplies from Libyan refineries and by enabling the use of Al Kufra airport for weapons deliveries. The Egyptian government reportedly summoned Haftar’s son to Cairo, where he received a stern warning regarding his father’s cooperation with the RSF. The pressure appears to have yielded results: Al Kufra airport was closed on January 19, 2026, reportedly due to construction works. However, this does not mean that the RSF has been completely cut off: there are indications that Ethiopia, as an ally of the UAE, allows the use of its territory to support the RSF, while South Sudan, due to its own internal conflict, appears to be increasingly drifting toward a position favorable to the RSF and its allies.

Despite the current impression that the SAF is gaining momentum, it seems that their maximum reach is control over Kordofan. It is difficult to believe that the SAF has the capacity to reestablish full control over the entire Darfur region, especially given the apparent opening of a new front in the southeast near the Ethiopian border. This in itself stretches SAF forces, and any potential involvement of Ethiopia in the RSF’s logistical network would provide new energy to this organization.

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The Sudanese war should be understood as a two-layered process: on the first level, it is a struggle of domestic armed formations for control over the state and revenues, while on the second level it has become a field of (de)stabilization in which regional actors seek to prevent an outcome that would endanger their security and economic interests in the Red Sea and the broader region. This is precisely why the shifting momentum on the battlefield can be understood not only as a consequence of tactical decisions by the direct participants in the conflict, but also as a function of the realignment of external support and pressure on supply lines. An additional layer of complexity is that the Red Sea is already within a dynamic of intensified militarization and competition among major and regional powers (including the idea of a Russian naval logistical base on the Sudanese coast), so the prolongation of the war could cement the fragmentation of Sudan while simultaneously expanding the geopolitical tendency of conflict across the entire space from the Horn of Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean.

 

Author:
Dr. Danilo Babić
Research associate